Bulgaria is unlikely to become Putin’s new proxy within the European Union

In early May, former Bulgarian president Rumen Radev was appointed as the country’s new prime minister, potentially bringing one of Europe’s longest-running political crises in recent years to an end.

Since 2021, Bulgaria has endured a prolonged period of political instability marked by fragmented parliaments, collapsing coalitions, caretaker governments, and repeated elections. The crisis culminated in the eighth parliamentary election in under five years on April 19, which delivered the first outright majority for a single political party since 1997.

Radev’s recently formed Progressive Bulgaria party is the result of complicated domestic political dynamics arising from institutional paralysis, rather than any firm ideological commitment to illiberalism. Nevertheless, some observers have speculated that following the recent electoral defeat of Hungary’s long-serving pro-Kremlin PM Viktor Orban, Bulgaria under Radev could now take on the role of Putin proxy within the European Union.

These concerns are rooted in the fact that throughout the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Radev has advocated for a more cautious and pragmatic European approach toward Moscow. He has consistently opposed sending military aid to Kyiv, and has criticized aspects of EU sanctions policy. Inevitably, Radev’s stance has been compared to Orban’s position on the Russia-Ukraine War. However, these comparisons become far less convincing when viewed in the context of Bulgaria’s internal political dynamics.

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Following Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union in 2007, the country’s political arena was dominated for more than a decade by the center-right GERB party under former prime minister Boyko Borisov. Borisov’s governments balanced relations between Brussels, Washington, and Moscow, while maintaining relative political stability domestically. That equilibrium was fundamentally undermined by a wave of anti-corruption protests in 2020–2021, which exposed deep Bulgarian public frustration with corruption, oligarchic influence, and entrenched patronage networks.

Rather than leading to a political reboot, the protests triggered a prolonged cycle of political instability. Reformist parties managed to briefly capitalize on public dissatisfaction, but failed to establish durable governing majorities amid the geopolitical polarization unleashed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In this climate of political paralysis and institutional exhaustion, Radev was able to expand his appeal beyond his largely ceremonial constitutional role as president.

For many voters, Radev’s outsider status made him increasingly attractive. His appeal was also rooted in his military background and emphasis on political stability amid a collapse of public trust in traditional party structures. Although formally associated with the center-left Bulgarian Socialist Party, Radev had in practice long positioned himself as a more populist and pragmatic political figure. In the early 1990s, he had studied at the US Air Force Squadron Officer School, and was later involved in Bulgaria’s NATO military integration as commander of the Bulgarian Air Force.

The new government in Sofia is now attempting to reassure international observers that Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic orientation will remain intact. Newly appointed Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova-Chamova, a Cambridge University-educated technocrat with experience working at the World Bank and World Health Organization, has emphasized that Bulgaria’s foreign policy will maintain a “clear direction” within the framework of the country’s existing alliances.

Likewise, the country’s new parliamentary leader Petar Vitanov has directly rejected speculation about a major geopolitical shift or pro-Kremlin realignment. “There will be no radical, extreme shift in foreign policy. For nine years, Rumen Radev has held very clear positions, and almost all European leaders have moved closer to them,” he commented.

This messaging appears designed to reassure European partners who are uneasy about the possible emergence of a new illiberal spoiler within the EU, while at the same time signaling a more restrained position toward Russia’s ongoing war. This includes emphasizing a peace settlement rather than military support for Ukraine, despite the previous government’s bilateral security cooperation agreement with Kyiv, signed in March.

The clearest signal of Progressive Bulgaria’s foreign policy trajectory will likely be its approach toward upcoming EU negotiations on funding and military assistance for Ukraine. At this stage, a more realistic comparison for the new Bulgarian government may be found in the positions taken by Prague and Bratislava, rather than the stance favored until last month in Budapest.

In any case, Bulgaria will not fundamentally abandon its Western orientation or attempt to revive the country’s Cold War era “special relationship” with Moscow.

Kristian Kafozov is a Research Scholar at the NYU Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia focused on the recent history of Bulgaria and ongoing geopolitical dynamics in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Image: Rumen Radev, leader of Bulgaria's largest political coalition "Progressive Bulgaria" and former Bulgarian president arrives to receive a mandate from Bulgarian President Iliana Iotova to form a new government, in Sofia, Bulgaria. May 7, 2026. (REUTERS/Spasiyana Sergieva)