Five outcomes that would make Trump’s trip to China a success

WASHINGTON—US President Donald Trump heads to China this week for his long-awaited summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Expectations are modest. On both sides, decision-making is highly concentrated in the top leader, so this face-to-face meeting is essential for managing tensions. But the visit is unlikely to produce a true reset. 

Washington and Beijing are stuck in an uneasy dynamic marked by deep distrust, mutual economic exposure, and growing efforts on both sides to disentangle their economies before that dependence can be weaponized. Common interests are hard to find, and turning the few that do exist into something that looks like real cooperation would require more political capital than either side seems to be willing to invest at this moment. 

Tactical gains, not strategic breakthroughs

As they move around Beijing, both leaders will be grappling for tactical gains. Xi will likely seek US concessions on technology export controls, Taiwan, and tariffs. Trump will likely seek large Chinese purchases of US goods, more US access to China’s rare earths, and progress on fentanyl cooperation. Trump will also want the kind of pageantry that frames the visit—and his handling of China—as a success for the US audience.

But even more important is what this visit will not accomplish. The summit is unlikely to produce meaningful Chinese support for US efforts on Iran. China wants to see the Strait of Hormuz reopened, but it is not interested in spending real diplomatic capital to bail the Trump administration out of the costs associated with the war. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Beijing and called on Iran to reopen the strait. But Wang carefully framed that appeal as coming from the international community, not the United States. Behind the scenes, Beijing still supports the Iranian regime. Chinese leaders are keeping that support quiet to avoid making Iran a major irritant in their relationship with Washington—not because their underlying position toward Tehran has changed.

There are also unlikely to be any major investment announcements. In April, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer stated that the two sides are working to launch a “Board of Investment” to facilitate projects between the two countries, but that effort appears to have stalled. It is difficult for companies and officials on either side to identify feasible sectors or projects. Trump has signaled openness to Chinese auto investments in the United States, but there is staunch opposition across the US auto sector. On a smaller scale, there could be some openness to consumer services—for example, China’s Luckin Coffee now has branches in New York. But manufacturing and technology remain sensitive on both sides.     

Five outcomes that would signal success

Though surprises are always possible, the visit will likely be defined by a narrow set of deliverables: Taiwan, export controls, trade, detainees, and critical minerals. These are the issues that I will be watching closely to assess whether the Trump-Xi meeting is a success for the United States.

First, avoid fumbles on Taiwan. Chinese leaders are hoping to use the summit to chip away at US support for Taiwan. Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-wun visited Beijing in April and took an unusually accommodationist approach in her meeting with Xi. However, back in Taipei, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te just overcame Cheng’s opposition to pass a twenty-five billion dollar special defense budget. Lai needs that budget to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities vis-à-vis China and allow the island to buy more arms from the United States, including an eleven-billion-dollar arms deal announced last year and a fourteen-billion-dollar package expected this year. But the Trump administration has not yet signed off on the fourteen-billion-dollar deal—his team is reportedly delaying that deal to avoid angering Beijing ahead of the summit. Beijing will try to convince Trump to prolong this delay.  

Xi will also push Trump to deviate from longstanding US messaging on Taiwan. For example, Chinese leadership may press him to say that the United States “opposes Taiwan independence” or make references to Lai that Beijing’s propaganda apparatus can spin as evidence of US disfavor. Chinese leaders despise Lai and see him as a barrier to reunification. They will be hoping to get Trump on the record in Beijing saying something that undercuts Lai and raises questions about whether Washington would actually come to the island’s defense in a future cross-strait crisis. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is reportedly joining the trip, and his guidance will be critical in avoiding such missteps. 

If Trump manages to steer clear of the traps on Taiwan, many in Washington will breathe a sigh of relief. Signaling to Chinese officials that his personal resolve is stronger than expected—and sending a similar message to the people of Taiwan—would be a true success. 

Second, separate US export controls from Chinese purchase commitments. Trump wants China to make big purchases to reduce the US trade deficit. This summit is expected to produce Chinese commitments to buy US soybeans, planes, and other goods that China had already promised to buy—but failed to fully deliver on—under the “Phase One” trade agreement with the first Trump administration. Although this is old wine in new bottles, such deals would be a win for farmers and businesses struggling under bilateral tariffs and seeking to clear inventory. Beijing will seek to leverage Trump’s desire for headline-grabbing purchase commitments to gain broader access to US advanced technologies, including semiconductor chips and aircraft engines. That effort to link purchases to technology is where the Trump administration needs to proceed with caution.

US export controls are national security measures. They target specific products that, according to US government assessments, would bolster China’s military capabilities in ways that directly undermine US national security. No US administration should put these—or any other national security measures—on a bargaining table. If the US government determines that a restriction is necessary to keep the country safe, that restriction should stay in place unless new information changes the original assessment.

US national security should not be traded for purchases that China would be making anyway if its economy operated more like a normal market. If relaxed export controls become part of those deals, that will be a win for China and a loss for the United States.

Third, reduce trade tensions. When Trump and Xi last met in South Korea in October 2025, they agreed to a twelve-month suspension of the tit-for-tat tariffs imposed in the preceding months. Those record-high tariffs have harmed both sides, and Washington and Beijing therefore share a common interest in extending the trade truce. Some form of extension is likely. 

The leaders will also likely discuss a “Board of Trade,” which appears to be taking shape as a government-to-government forum where each side will put forward lists of non-sensitive goods, with the aim of reducing tariffs in sectors without national security, market distortion, or competition concerns. The problem, of course, is that this approach does not address the major US concerns about China’s economic model. Nor would it resolve the biggest US industry complaints regarding market access in China—Beijing is unlikely to open up its auto sector, for example. Still, establishing this new framework would help reduce tensions and expand trade in sectors where there is little downside—and where increased sales could directly benefit US companies.

Fourth, free detainees. This summit could produce some real surprises on detainees. In the run-up to the summit, the White House released a tally of the Americans freed thus far, and it is impressive. Trump has demonstrated a willingness to press Xi on this issue. China is holding multiple high-profile detainees, including Americans and individuals the Chinese government unjustly detained because of their ties to the United States. Ekpar Asat is among them. He visited the United States in 2016 to participate in a State Department program and was detained in China upon his return. Securing freedom for Asat and other detainees is a priority for both parties in Congress. 

For China, releasing detainees could generate goodwill in Washington at a time when many Americans—including many members of Congress—do not view China as a safe place to travel. Beijing gains little from keeping these individuals behind bars, but could reap substantial political and diplomatic capital from releasing them. 

Fifth, secure stronger commitments from Beijing on critical minerals. Following the Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea, the White House issued a fact sheet claiming China had made multiple commitments on critical minerals. One pledge was that China would “suspend the global implementation of the expansive new export controls on rare earths and related measures that it announced on October 9, 2025.” Another pledge was that it would “issue general licenses valid for exports of rare earths, gallium, germanium, antimony, and graphite for the benefit of U.S. end users and their suppliers around the world.” The fact sheet further claimed that the “general license means the de facto removal of controls China imposed since 2023.” 

But China’s own readout, conveyed through a Ministry of Commerce press conference, did not include those commitments. Instead, it stated that China would “suspend its related export control measures announced on October 9 for one year and study and refine specific plans.” In practice, however, the export controls remain in place. US firms still need licenses to import rare earths from China, and those licenses continue to be granted on a company-by-company basis—and no broad US “general license” exists. China also continues to apply the October export controls on US allies and partners. 

While Beijing wants to keep this chokehold in place, Washington wants to loosen it enough to buy time for US and allied de-risking efforts, including building out other rare-earth mining and processing capabilities. If the United States can push Beijing to make more detailed commitments on this issue—ideally coming from Xi himself—that would give US and allied negotiators greater leverage in pushing for implementation and compliance. But China will not offer such concessions for free. It will seek something in return, such as a relaxation of US export controls that were imposed on the basis of real national security concerns. As a result, if there is movement on this issue, it is more likely to be incremental than radical.

Overall, the best-case outcome for the United States is a summit where Trump avoids major fumbles on Taiwan and export controls, reduces trade tensions, makes moderate progress with China on other bilateral irritants, and secures the release of priority detainees. 

That outcome is entirely feasible, but so is the inverse, and surprises are always possible.