Trade disputes, Taiwan and Iran war: Can US and China reach a consensus?

As US President Donald Trump prepares to touch down in China for his first visit to the country since the start of his second term, the world is once again watching the uneasy dance between the world’s two largest economies. 

On the surface, the agenda reads like a standard superpower summit: trade, technology, geopolitics and regional security. But beneath the polished schedule lies a striking paradox - one that would have seemed unthinkable only a decade ago.

Today, it is China, not the United States, that appears to be carrying the torch for free trade and multilateral cooperation. Meanwhile, Washington - long the global champion of open markets - finds itself entangled in protectionist instincts, trade wars of its own making, and a painful geopolitical quagmire in the Middle East.

When Trump and his team meet their Chinese counterparts this time, the contrasts will be impossible to ignore.

Economically, the White House is expected to press Beijing on two fronts: firstly, to relax export controls on critical rare earth products - materials essential to American manufacturers, particularly those supplying the military-industrial complex - and secondly, to buy more American agricultural goods.

Rare earth minerals are no ordinary commodity. They power precision-guided missiles, fighter jet avionics, and drone technologies. For years, China’s dominance over rare earth supply chains has been a source of quiet anxiety in Washington. 

Now, as US manufacturers scramble to secure their supply chains, Trump finds himself asking China for help - an awkward role reversal for a country that once prided itself on technological self-sufficiency.

Differing expectations

On agriculture, the hope is that China will once again purchase American soybeans, corn and pork in large volumes. That, too, is a familiar script from earlier trade talks. But the unstated irony is clear: the US wants China to open its market, while keeping its own relatively closed to Chinese investments and goods through high tariffs and a protectionist tax regime.

China, for its part, will likely arrive with a very different set of expectations. It wants the US to create a fairer, more reasonable tax environment for Chinese goods, and to welcome Chinese investments without the kind of political scrutiny that has led to blocked deals in recent years. In other words, China is asking the US to live up to the free trade ideals that Washington itself once championed.

Is it not paradoxical that the country lecturing others about open markets today is the same one that has built walls - both literal and figurative - against foreign competition? When it comes to trade, the roles have almost completely reversed.

On the geopolitical front, the differences are even starker. According to reports and analysts, Trump is likely to ask China to use its influence with Iran to help broker an end to the military conflict between Tehran and the US-Israeli coalition - a conflict initiated by the latter.

Trump’s urgency is understandable. The Iran war has become a draining liability, and with midterm elections looming at home, the White House needs a quick exit strategy. 

Voters are weary of endless foreign entanglements. The defence industry may be profiting, but American families are not. To have any hope in the midterms, Trump needs to show that he can end a war, not just start one.

China’s position, however, is rooted in a different philosophy. For decades, Beijing has consistently advocated for world peace based on coexistence and development for all nations on equal terms, without any single country exercising hegemonic control. That principle is enshrined in China’s foreign policy, from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to its more recent Global Security Initiative.

Importantly, China also understands and appreciates that nations have different systems, histories and aspirations. That is why Beijing does not impose preconditions when dealing with other countries, including Iran. This non-interventionist approach has earned China a degree of trust in Tehran that Washington cannot match. Whether that trust can be leveraged to end a war, however, is a different question.

China may be willing to facilitate dialogue, but it will not do so as a junior partner following US orders. Any Chinese role in de-escalating the Iran crisis will be on China’s own terms - not as a favour to the White House, but as part of a broader vision for global stability.

Emerging global order

No discussion of US-China relations is complete without addressing Taiwan. It is expected that the upcoming summit will touch upon this most sensitive of issues. The question is whether there will be any joint consensus - or more precisely, whether the US leadership will openly pronounce its disapproval of separatist activities on the island.

Washington has long maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity. But ambiguity is a luxury when the situation on the ground is becoming less ambiguous by the day. Certain forces in Taiwan have grown increasingly emboldened, encouraged by congressional visits, arms sales and symbolic gestures from the US side.

China’s position is clear: Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and separatist activities of any kind are unacceptable. What Beijing would like to hear from Trump is a clear, unequivocal statement that the US does not support Taiwan independence and disapproves of any separatist activities on the island.

Whether Trump is willing to go that far remains to be seen. Known for not being a traditional foreign policy hawk, Trump has shown a willingness to surprise his own advisers. But any concession on Taiwan would face immediate blowback from Congress and the defence establishment, making it a politically costly move ahead of the November midterms.

Perhaps the most profound observation to emerge from the current state of US-China relations is the quiet death of US hegemony - not because China has replaced it, but because the very concept of a single hegemonic power no longer fits the reality of a multipolar world.

China does not seek to dominate the global order. It seeks to participate in it, to reshape it incrementally, and to ensure that no single country can impose its will on others. That is why China pushes for regional free trade agreements, while the US retreats behind tariffs and sanctions.  

If Trump wants China's help on rare earths, agriculture and Iran, he will have to offer something in return

This is not a moral argument. It is a practical one. When the US abandons free trade, it creates a vacuum that other nations - including China - are eager to fill.

Trump’s visit to China is unlikely to resolve all these contradictions. Trade disputes will not disappear after one meeting. The Iran war will not end with a single phone call. And Taiwan will remain a dangerous flashpoint for years to come.

But the summit does offer an opportunity for clarity. It forces both sides to confront a new reality: the old order, with the US as the undisputed leader and China as a junior partner, is gone. What is emerging is something messier, more competitive, and yet - paradoxically - more open to dialogue.

If Trump wants China’s help on rare earths, agriculture and Iran, he will have to offer something in return. If China wants fairer treatment for its investments and goods, it will have to continue making the case that free trade benefits everyone, not just Beijing.

And if the world is lucky, the two leaders might even agree on one thing: that no nation, however powerful, can build a stable future on the ruins of cooperation.