We Can’t Curb Nuclear Proliferation If We Don’t Acknowledge Israel’s Nukes

Thirty House Democrats, led by Rep. Joaquin Castro, publicly asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio on May 4 to end the long-standing U.S. policy of ambiguity around Israel’s nuclear capabilities. In a letter, the group asked for answers on detailed questions about Israel’s warheads, delivery systems, fissile material production, and nuclear doctrine. They argue that Congress has a constitutional responsibility to understand the nuclear balance in the Middle East and warn that official silence makes coherent nonproliferation policy impossible.

Lawmakers tied their demand for transparency directly to the current U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, warning that fighting alongside a state whose nuclear posture remains officially unacknowledged heightens the risks of miscalculation and escalation. It also makes the United States out to be hypocritical — citing the nonexistent threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon yet to be built, which Iran had forsworn, while simultaneously ignoring Israel’s secret, unmonitored, undiscussed nuclear weapons arsenal.

If the United States claims to be deeply concerned about nuclear proliferation in the region, the government has a responsibility to stop ignoring facts that make the entirety of U.S. foreign policy on proliferation look completely disingenuous. The U.S. cannot keep sending billions in weapons unconditionally to a nuclear-armed state while treating open discussion of that reality as impermissible.

This letter is a rare and important challenge to one of the most entrenched taboos in U.S. foreign policy: acknowledging that Israel has an undeclared nuclear arsenal for decades and that Washington has largely complied with Israel’s desire to maintain silence around it. That posture goes all the way back to a secret 1969 understanding that allowed the issue to remain publicly unspoken even as it has shaped regional calculations. For decades, Washington would not acknowledge Israel’s nuclear capability, and Israel would not confirm it. But declassified National Security Archive material suggests that by 1969, U.S. agencies had already accumulated enough sensitive evidence to treat the issue as a serious intelligence matter, while also deciding that political and foreign policy costs outweighed the benefits of pressing it openly. The result was an unofficial understanding that helped lock the subject inside a veil of deniability, even as internal investigations, wiretaps, and intelligence briefings continued behind the scenes.

If the formal public stance of the U.S. is to not support the existence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East — whether in Iran or Israel — then the foreign policy objective should be to advocate for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. This would require acknowledging that war has utterly failed as a strategy to prevent that goal, especially when the fake threat of an active nuclear weapons program is used to justify military action — as has been the case in costly, useless U.S. wars in Iraq and now in Iran.

The goal of nonproliferation cannot be credible if it is selective. Israel is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while Iran is. Simply acknowledging that fact does not require putting full trust in Tehran to abide by the treaty — indeed, that’s why Iran has been subjected to countless inspection regimes; it simply means that any honest regional nonproliferation framework has to begin with the facts as they are, not as Washington prefers to describe them.

Those facts and suspicions have been a matter of public record for decades, even if U.S. officials have often refused to address them publicly. As far back as 1965, the U.S. government knew that over 200 pounds of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium had gone missing from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) plant in Pennsylvania — triggering enduring investigations and allegations by the CIA and other agencies that the material was clandestinely diverted to the Israeli nuclear program. Decades later, in 1986, former Dimona technician Mordechai Vanunu leaked photographs and data to the Sunday Times that exposed the full scale of Israel’s covert weapons program. These facts have long been known and reported on by countless media outlets and scholars, even if they were officially evaded by the U.S. government.

That is why the Castro letter deserves attention beyond the news cycle. The lawmakers wrote that ambiguity about Israel’s program makes coherent nonproliferation policy impossible not only for Iran, but for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and every other state making decisions based on the capabilities of its neighbors. These 30 Democrats are right to express this concern, and the principle involved is larger than one conflict: There’s no such thing as a rules-based order built on exceptions for allies and punishment for adversaries.

We will not be able to resolve complex issues of nuclear proliferation if we cannot even share a basic reality. The Orwellian “ceasefires” in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran illustrate this clearly. The U.S. government and its allies lie, and then expect the other side to not just accept their terms, but also their version of the truth — a recipe for perpetual conflict.

Ironically, tragic and repeated U.S. failures of diplomacy have strengthened the most conservative forces inside Iran, who benefit most from isolation, siege, and perpetual confrontation. If U.S. officials profess to care about the Iranian people, regional peace, and genuine nonproliferation, they should be building diplomatic pathways that reduce incentives for weaponization, not destroying the possibility of trust altogether.

The United States should state openly what it knows, demand transparency from all regional actors, and return to the hard work of diplomacy. The rest of Congress should insist on answers to the questions raised in the Castro letter, not bury them. And anyone serious about preventing nuclear catastrophe should be willing to say a simple thing out loud: There is no credible nonproliferation policy that begins by pretending not to see the bombs your ally already has.