Report of a Workshop on Preparing for Biological Weapons Investigations in Non-Permissive Environments

Introduction

The Stimson Center’s Mission Ready project, funded by the U.S. Department of State, aims to identify and recommend measures to address specific training and capability gaps facing the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism (UNSGM) in preparing for investigations of alleged use of biological weapons (BW) in non-permissive environments (NPE). The Stimson project team convened a workshop in December 2025, bringing together negotiators, planners, and practitioners with direct experience in missions deployed to NPEs to examine how such environments might shape future UNSGM investigations of alleged BW attacks. This report synthesizes the workshop’s principal insights and recommendations for strengthening UNSGM preparedness, effectiveness, and resilience in carrying out investigations in NPEs.

Defining Non-Permissive Environments for UNSGM Missions

The United Nations General Assembly adopted Guidelines and Procedures for the UNSGM in 1989 (with updated appendices in 2007), which anticipated a certain level of challenge in performing such investigations. Per these Guidelines and Procedures, the UN Member State(s) receiving the investigation team is expected to assure the security of the team and its equipment, samples, and evidence, all of which would be agreed upon through a Host Country Agreement with the United Nations.

Participants noted, however, that in past analogous missions, a country’s high-level political agreement to an international mission rarely guaranteed complete alignment of lower-level policies and authorities, even in the absence of overt intra-state conflict. They pointed to investigations into alleged use of chemical weapons (CW) in Syria; CW destruction operations in Libya; conventional arms inspections in Ukraine, Russia, and elsewhere; monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN sanctions; and response to Ebola and other infectious disease-outbreaks. Based on these experiences, participants described non-permissive situations ranging from sniper fire, kidnapping risks, systemic disinformation campaigns, and deliberate obstruction by host actors to hostile or chaotic scenes upon arrival at an inspection site and local communities seeking treatment for injuries related or unrelated to the investigative mission. In some cases, the non-permissiveness of an environment was gendered, such as restrictions on female team members’ movement and interactions, or requirements to wear unfamiliar and restrictive clothing.

Participants stressed the importance of integrating local drivers, interpreters, and medical staff into safety and security training and preparations, while also managing the vulnerabilities they could introduce and mitigating the unique risks local staff faced both during the mission and in the longer term after its conclusion.

They also described customs delays where crucial equipment was restricted or confiscated, evacuation challenges, and security risks tied to certain team member nationalities. They reiterated that teams are expected to perform at a high level while adapting to new procedures, elevated risks, and direct exposure to human grief and suffering. Local staff, including from other international and non-governmental organizations, as well as the families of investigators, faced heightened risk both during and after the mission. Participants noted that trauma from the sustained stress and danger emerged in some cases only weeks or years later.

• Restricted movement and site access: Unpredictable checkpoints, security escorts that may be unreliable or withdrawn without warning, and gendered constraints are just a few of the causes.
• Fragmented or contested authority: Exemplified by multiple armed groups, informal influencers, or parallel governments with conflicting interests.
• Information scarcity and manipulation: Rumors spreading faster than validated information; mis/disinformation campaigns; AI-generated fabrications.
• Limited acceptance of mission presence: Local populations may view investigators as politically aligned or threatening; international and non-governmental organizations may perceive missions as disruptive.
• Limited or disputed agreement on the mandate: While the UNSGM is mandated by the General Assembly and operates at the discretion of the Secretary General, stakeholders may demonstrate varying levels of acceptance of or ability to facilitate the mandate.
• Degraded infrastructure: Inadequate communications, medical care, logistics, transportation, storage, sanitation, and emergency extraction pathways.
• Risks to safety, security, and integrity of the team and its mission: National and international political pressure; surveillance; active infectious disease outbreak; conflict; hostile hosts, populations, or armed groups.
• Risks to safety and security of local, in-country mission support and local participants (e.g., witnesses) in the investigation: Physical threats, disinformation, and psychological pressure that may dissuade locals from supporting the team, limiting their support, or resulting in their loss of life, income, or security after the investigation concludes.
• High stress: Working on high-stakes issues under public scrutiny and surveillance while subject to time and other constraints; dependence on actors who may have overt or covert adversarial intentions; and heightened security risk for witnesses and local staff. Mis/disinformation campaigns may target family members of the team.

Participants agreed that the default assumption in planning for any future UNSGM investigation is that it will be conducted in a non-permissive operational environment. Mission design must reflect the reality that nothing can be taken for granted, from availability of information to security and access. There is no guarantee that a team, even if assembled, will deploy. Even after deployment, work may be curtailed, with both intentional and unintentional delays, logistic challenges, lack of cooperation, and political issues beyond the team’s control resulting in no results or unsatisfying results. Teams must be prepared to find nothing, report no evidence of an attack, or “fail” for other reasons beyond the team’s control.

Additional Operational Challenges for BW Investigations in Non-Permissive Environments

Participants noted that unlike chemical incidents with immediate and observable signatures, alleged biological events are often ambiguous (i.e., natural vs. accidental vs. deliberate), evolving over time, and impacted by first responder public-health interventions that may destroy or alter evidence. The unique traits of biological incidents complicate sampling strategies, chain-of-custody integrity, and interpretation of findings. Interviews of witnesses and victims can therefore become just as important as samples, requiring deliberately structured methodologies and techniques to navigate the associated emotional, ethical, and practical issues. Such issues include trauma, possible political pressure and threats of retribution for cooperation with the investigation, and motivations for cooperating (e.g. seeking accountability and justice) that may be inconsistent with the scope of the mission.

Participants emphasized that a UNSGM investigation into an alleged BW attack requires a thoughtful and deliberate balance of scientific expertise and investigative skills. Mission planners and the team lead should consider carefully the appropriate mix of investigators with scientific background or expertise and scientific experts who can be trained in investigative techniques. While biological sampling and analysis are vital technical skills for an investigation, interviews are no less important. The UNSGM Guidelines acknowledge the importance of interviews as part of the investigative process, and Appendix IX specifies the basic standards and methodological considerations for interviewing. However, many of the workshop participants emphasized that conducting effective investigative interviews requires a very specific set of linguistic and cognitive skills, experience, and preparation that are not commonly part of scientists’ prior experience.

Participants also underscored that the information space surrounding disease outbreaks and BW is also inherently volatile and particularly susceptible to misinformation — including rumors, conspiracy theories, and political narratives — emerging and spreading rapidly. Artificial intelligence-enabled manipulation and deepfakes can target the mission or individuals. Participants noted that “no comment” approaches fail when bystanders post real-time videos. Information integrity and communication strategies are therefore essential to mission credibility.

At the same time, participants noted that the authority and resources to conduct the investigation of an alleged BW attack are extremely constrained. In the field, the UNSGM shares the inherent limitations of other international investigative mechanisms, which do not have coercive authority and must be prepared to negotiate cooperation at every step of the investigation. It differs from treaty-based investigative entities, however, in its constitution as an ad hoc mechanism supported by a roster of on-call experts nominated by countries and maintained by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which serves as overall custodian of the mechanism. The UNSGM roster currently includes more than 600 individuals nominated as “qualified experts” by Member States from all UN regional groupings.  By comparison, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was designed to support inspections to help verify compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and therefore maintains a standing staff of trained inspectors capable of investigating possible chemical weapons use. Coordinating and fostering teamwork among the UNSGM’s roster of disparate experts, unused to working together on a daily basis, would be critical to success. While the UNSGM Guidelines recommend the creation of integrated teams, preparedness training, the development of a mission work program, the use of standardized procedures, and the support and coordination provided by embedded UN staff, workshop participants underscored the importance of building esprit de corps and trust on these teams. They discussed additional measures to review roster nominations for accuracy; however, UNODA is limited in resources to accomplish associated tasks. Further, the extra-budgetary nature of the funding for all UNSGM preparatory activity creates uncertainties and vulnerabilities to long-term planning and preparation. In particular, the UNODA regular budget funds only one part-time staff member for the UNSGM. While donor states currently fund three additional staff, reliable and sustainable capacity to successfully investigate an alleged BW attack depends on dedicated resourcing.

Recommendations – Training and Other Supportive Measures for the UNSGM in Non-Permissive Environments

Drawing on the workshop’s discussion of the particular nuances of any future investigation of an alleged BW attack, participants recommended several priority areas for UNSGM training and other supportive measures for the UNSGM in NPEs, including incorporation of new technology into investigations, roster management strategies, team and in-country support staff psychosocial care, and design and management of communication strategies in an increasingly contested information environment. The Stimson project team provided a longer and more detailed list of recommendations to UNODA for further consideration and implementation.